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The expansion of government in the field of administration
became the subject of special comment at the beginning of the
present century.' That the development of the administrative
function has been an outstanding trend of our era has been
repeatedly remarked by political scientists, lawyers, and judges
Even the politicians and business men, who have generally
denounced it, have not hesitated to further the development
whenever it served their particular ends. Those who have
deplored the encroachment of government upon the private
concerns of life, have nevertheless cried out for governmental
regulation of banks, stock exchanges, public utilities, and many
other agencies that seemed to them to need subjection to the
commonweal. Those who have complained against the ever
increasing expense of government, have nevertheless recom-
mended the establishment of one department after another for
the doing of things which could not be intrusted to private
hands, such as the construction of highways, the control of
waterways, the regulation of radio broadcasting. Those who
have deprecated the arbitrary rule of bureaucracy, have never-
theless consented again and again to the delegation of legisla-
tive and judicial authority to executive agencies in order to
meet the needs of modern technological society, relieve the
pressure upon the time of legislatures, permit experiments, and
provide for the emergencies occasioned by sudden changes.
Whether we like it or not this development in administra-
tion seems to be an essential part of our social evolution. The
* Robert Wilkin, Former Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
1 Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States."
(1905) Preface, and pp. I, 155.
Frankfurter and Davison: "Cases on Administrative Law," Preface to
the first edition.
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complexity of modern life, the congestion of society, the facility
of travel and communication, make it absolutely necessary for
government to be more attentive to the general welfare. It
can no longer confine its efforts to the maintenance of peace and
the redress of individual grievances; individual interests di-
minish in number and importance. Government must be pri-
marily interested in public policies and their administration. In
order to administer such policies efficiently, in order indeed to
give effective expression to the vital will of the state, it has been
found necessary to have some overlapping of the functions of
the fundamental divisions of government. It has been impos-
sible to confine the work of the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial departments in hair-line divisions.3 The necessary
harmony between the expression and the execution of state poli-
cies can be obtained only by the subordination of some of the
functions of each department to the others and the coordination
of all. Some authorities have added to Montesquieu's trinity
a fourth division of government, viz., the administrative de-
partment.4
Whereas at first the study of the administrative function
and the powers and duties of administrative officers was the
exclusive field of political scientists, more recently the legal
faculties have been offering courses in administrative law, even
though the teachers admit that there are hardly as yet any
principles well enough established to be classified as law. Case
books have been made and texts have been written in an at-
tempt to systematize the decisions and analyze the tentative
principles. While the teachers admit that they are dealing with
new juristic forces, and that all effort is mere groping, still they
hope that their attempts at systematization may prove of assist-
3 "It is a commonplace that the exigencies of effective administration per-
mit little more than lip service to the classic notion that all government activity
should be chopped into blocks and handed out, like Gaul, to three separate
custodians." Charles S. Hyneman, Vol. LI, Political Science Quarterly, No. 3,
p. 383.
See also James Madison: The Federalist, No. XLVII.
4 Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.," p. 13 1.
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ance to administrators, lawyers, and judges in the evolution of
a body of administrative law.
Lawyers generally complain of the chaotic conditions of the
practice before administrative boards, bureaus, and agents, and
a committee of the American Bar Association has recently rec-
ommended the creation of a federal administrative court with
the hope that some guiding precedents might be established,
some uniformity of practice outlined, and an opportunity af-
forded for judicial review of administrative orders. A bill'
has been introduced in Congress providing for such an admin-
istrative tribunal, uniting under its jurisdiction the work of
numerous courts, boards, and agencies now exercising, each in
its own way, judicial authority over administrative affairs. The
object is to bring our administrative development under the
rule of law, in order that the efficiency of government may be
increased without loss of the essential rights of person and
property. It is an indication of the extent and urgency of the
problem that Harvard Law School this year celebrated the
tercentenary of the University by calling a conference of Eng-
lish, Irish, Canadian, and American jurists to discuss the future
of the common law as faced by this administrative advance.
We have shown an unbounded faith in legislation as a cure
for economic evils and as an inhibition against waste of natural
and social resources. We have then very generously bestowed
administrative power in order to make such legislation effective.
It is now the important problem of our time to work out an
adequate technique of administrative procedure and judicial
review. It is futile merely to denounce the extension of ad-
ministrative control. We must study its purposes, the proper
phases and qualifications of its operation, and try to devise a
mechanism and system for its proper operation. As one of the
authorities in this field has pointed out, if we cannot offer a
solution for every problem we may nevertheless render some
,Logan Bill, S. 1835, 73d Cong. First Sess. For general discussion see
Advance Program Committee Reports, 5 9 th Annual Meeting, American Bar
As.sociation, August 24-28, 1936, at page 2o9.
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assistance if we can indicate why some problems are as yet un-
solved.'
The Conservancy Act of Ohio" is an interesting instance of
administrative development and affords a study of a notable
attempt to solve some of the most perplexing administrative
problems. It was passed by the legislature under the general
authority of Section 36 of Article II of the Constitution of
Ohio, adopted as an amendment in I912.8 We are indebted
for that provision of the Constitution to the conservation pio-
neers of that day.9 Since the Conservancy Act deals mainly
with the control of water and incidentally with other natural
resources, it embraces a field which has always been recognized
as a proper if not the exclusive sphere of governmental action.
It was a striking extension of administrative action in this coun-
try but the advance was in a field over which governments of
Europe had exercised jurisdiction from earliest times.
The inciting cause of the enactment was the devastating
flood of the spring of 1913. The effects of the flood were so
terrible in Dayton, Ohio, and the entire Miami valley that civic
leaders and the population in general were moved to heroic
efforts against a recurrence of the disaster. Several millions of
dollars were raised by subscription for the purpose of making a
survey of the watershed and of existing provisions of law in
order to determine the physical and legal possibilities. That
survey revealed the necessity of new law for the new need.
The necessary protective work would be so local in character
that no state agency was authorized to do it. On the other
' Ernst Freund: "The Growth of American Administrative Law," p. 41.
7 Sections 68z8-i to 6828-79, inclusive, of the General Code. For a
general analysis of the Conservancy Act with citation of authorities, see 8 Ohio
Jur. 15.
8 Miami County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215: The opinion indicates that
the general police power of the legislature would have been sufficient without
special constitutional grant.
' Men like David C. Warner of Columbus were at that time the voice of
nature crying in man's industrial wilderness.
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hand, it would be so extensive that it was found to be beyond
the jurisdiction of any city or any county. It was evident that a
new law would have to be enacted which would create a new
subdivision of government, the jurisdiction of which would
extend to the limits of the watershed, or as far as necessary
to control floods of the territory. Well-recognized engineering
and legal authorities were drawn into collaboratiou for the
creation of such law."0
The developments in the Miami valley afford a striking
example of the manner in which increase of population and its
attendant civilization require an increase in the administrative
action of government. In pioneer days floods had been looked
upon as acts of Divine Providence beyond the control of man.
At the time of storms individuals did what they could for self-
preservation and accepted the results with resignation. The
gradual influx of people, however, together with the construc-
tion of homes, schools, churches, industries, and public buildings
and utilities, increased the sense of community need and thus
brought about community effort. When it became apparent
that there were things which could and should be done for the
protection of the community, it also became apparent that some
governmental agency should do it. It could not be intrusted
to private enterprise. The things to be done made it quite
apparent that the agency charged with the doing of them would
need broad administrative powers, including some authority of a
legislative character and some authority of a judicial character.1
The Act provides that the common pleas court of any coun-
ty, upon petition of the required number of freeholders, may,
after notice, hearing, and a finding that requisite facts exist,
order the creation of a conservancy district which shall be "a
1 Dr. Arthur E. Morgan, at present Chairman of the Board of the Ten-
ncs.ue Valley Authority, was chief engineer, and Mr. John A. McMahon of
Dayton, in consultation with Judge Oren Britt Brown of Dayton, and Judge
John F. Dillon of New York, acted as chief legal counsel. Hon. James M.
Cox of Dayton was at that time Governor of Ohio and gave political and
executive support of the greatest value.
11 Miami County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, SYl. 9.
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political subdivision of the State of Ohio, a body corporate with
all the powers of a corporation," and "the right of eminent
domain and of taxation and assessment." While such authority
is vested in the existing common pleas court the law provides
that a court composed of one common pleas judge from each
of the counties having land in the district shall sit in the court-
house where the original petition was filed and make the find-
ings required by the Act, a majority of judges being necessary to
render a decision.12
When such court finds the necessary conditions to exist and
orders the creation of a district, then it is required to appoint a
board of directors, who are given general authority to carry into
execution the purposes of the district. Such board is first re-
quired to prepare an official plan for the improvements for
which the district was created. That plan must then be submit-
ted to the court, notice published, and a time set for the hearing
of objections, if any. Such plan may be approved, amended, or
rejected by the court. If approved, the court shall then appoint
three appraisers to value the lands and other property to be
acquired and appraise all benefits and damages accruing to lands
by reason of the execution of the plan. Upon the filing of the
report of such appraisers, and after publishing notice, the court
must hear all objections or exceptions. The court may return
the report for further consideration and amendment, or if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that the estimated cost
of constructing the improvement is less than the benefits ap-
praised, then the court must approve and confirm the report.
The board of directors is authorized, subject to the approval
of the court, to levy assessments based upon the benefits so
appraised; and the board is also given limited power to levy
a general tax.
The provisions of law requiring that a court order the
creation of the district, appoint the directors, and approve the
fundamental acts of the directors, have been criticized. Some
political scientists and public officers have expressed the opinion
12 Snyder, et al., v. Deeds, et al., 91 Ohio St. 407.
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that it would be better to vest such authority to create, appoint,
and approve in some state executive or administrative agency.
They feel that courts of law should be preserved for litigious
business only, that is, for the determination of such controver-
sies as have customarily been disposed of in courts of law. They
insist that the reference of such administrative matters to such
judicial tribunals has a tendency to involve the court in matters
for which it is not well equipped, to embroil the court in po-
litical issues, and to subject the court to corrupting influences
or the suspicion of corruption. They affirm or imply that such
obligations as the Conservancy Act imposes are extraneous to
the essential purposes and character of a court of justice.
It would seem that none of such objections are well
founded. 3 It is a very salutary provision to require whenever
possible that some independent court, after due notice to all
parties in interest and full hearing of all objections, shall make
a finding that the necessary conditions exist before the admin-
istrative authority delegated by the legislature is exercised.'
Such a provision tends to prevent arbitrary action and silence
the general criticism against bureaucratic authority. There is,
moreover, ample precedent for the exercise of such authority
by courts of law. There was originally no distinction between
officers who administered justice and officers who administered
government. In the ordinary monarchy all powers were dele-
gated by the crown. The Roman praetor, the chief judicial
officer under the republic, exercised both imperium and juris-
dictio.5 The Norman political system made no distinction be-
tween civil and judicial authorities. For a long time after the
'aMiami County v. Dayton, 9z Ohio St. 215, 11o N.E. 726.
Hawthorne v. Troy, ioz Ohio St. 689.
Silvey v. Miami Conservancy District, ioz Ohio St. 690.
Ambrose v. Miami Conservancy District, 104 Ohio St. 615.
Silvey v. Montgomery County (D.C.) 273 Fed. zoz.
Orr v. Allen, I6 Ohio L. Rep. 457, 63 Law. Ed. U. S. Sup. Ct.
Rep. io9.
"' Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.," pp.
378, 380, et sey.
"' Hunter: "Roman Law," 2nd Edition, p. 41.
40 LAW JOURNAL -DECEMBER, 1936
differentiation of the legislative authority there was still no
legal distinction between judicial and executive officers."0
Later in England justices of the peace bearing both an admin-
istrative and judicial character acted as licensing authorities and
issued administrative orders in the form of judicial decisions.
In colonial times in this country the administrative as well as
the judicial business of the counties was under the general di-
rection of the justices of the peace.' Representation in the
governmental functions was thus distributed, as it is in the
Conservancy Act. The county court, as successor to the justices
of the peace and otherwise, exercised many administrative func-
tions."
It has been quite customary down to the present time to
vest in courts the administrative power to grant licenses, to
incorporate companies, to appoint building commissioners, to
appoint election officers, determine the necessity for elections,
and the expediency of other public action. As to corruption,
the temptation is no greater in administrative than other affairs
of the court. In those instances where corruption has been
found in connection with the performance of administrative
duties, it can be shown that the corruption was occasioned more
directly by the method of electing the judges and by their
indefinite tenure than by the nature of the business of the
court. 9
The finding of a court as to the necessity and propriety of
administrative action before the action is taken operates in
prospect and obviates the necessity of later and more vexatious
litigation. Such findings are in the nature of declaratory judg-
ments and serve the same good ends. Carrying Dr. Goodnow's
simile a little further, if constitutional law deals with the anat-
Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.," p. 420.
17 Freund: "Administrative Powers over Persons and Property," p. Io.
Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S," pp.
18o, 184, 205, 424.
" Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S," pp.
190, 200.
'o Edward M. Martin: "The Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in
Chicago," pp. 255, 273.
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omy of government while administrative law deals with the
functions or physiology of government, we might say that the
development of such prospective judgments is like the modern
practice of preventive medicine."0 The evolution of govern-
ment seems to be away from the business of determining pun-
ishment for past crimes and damages for past injuries and
toward the process of establishing principles by which crimes
against society and injury to individuals may be avoided or by
which assured compensation may be granted without contest
where injury is unavoidable. Less and less are judges required
to be mere referees at trials by battle (battles of brain if not of
brawn) and more and more the administration of justice tends
to administration. 1
The Act grants very broad administrative powers to the
Board of Directors. As already stated the Board prepares the
plans for the work of the district and is given full power to
execute such plans. It selects all other officers, engineers, attor-
neys, and agents. Its agents may enter upon lands to make
surveys and examinations. It has power to clean out, straighten,
widen, deepen, alter, divert, or fill up any water course; to
20 Goodnow: "The Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.,"
P. 3.
"2 Illus.: The inadequacy of the common-law action for damages as a
means of compensating injured workmen led to public insurance and the In-
dustrial Commission (Ohio); the inability of the action for fraud and deceit
to protect the public against unscrupulous promoters and stock-jobbers called
for the creation of the Securities (Blue Sky) Department; the futility of legal
action against unfair competition produced the Fderal Trade Commission;
and now the procedure of all such agencies calls for some such systematization
as had been worked out for courts and our courts are called upon to protect
fundamental common-law principles of justice.
Goodnow: "The Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.,"
p. 427. Other instances in Ohio law of the beneficial effect of "concurrent
adjudication" upon the administrative function are found in the statutes gov-
erning liquidation of building and loan associations (Ohio G.C. 687-1 et seq.)
and banks (Ohio G.C. 71o-9 o , et se,.), and in the statutes directing the assess-
ment of inheritance taxes (Ohio G.C. 5340, et seq.). Certain evils and in-
conveniences of practice before other administrative agencies such as the
Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission might be relieved by
provisions for preliminary or concurrent judgments of the courts.
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construct canals, levees, dams, reservoirs, ditches, and other
structures; to build, elevate or change streets, roadways, and
bridges. It is given a dominant right of eminent domain over
such right of railroad, telegraph, telephone, gas, water-power,
and other companies, and over that of townships, villages,
counties, and cities. It may remove villages and cemeteries.
For the purposes of the district its powers supersede all others,
individual, corporate, and public. It may make regulations to
protect its property and works; to control the use of water;
and may police the works and compel assistance. Necessarily
its powers had to be somewhat commensurate with the forces
of nature which it was created to control.22
But the Act does not disregard any constitutional rights. 3
It was carefully drawn to meet the requirements of due process
of law and uniformity of operation."' Full provision is made at
every stage of the development of a district for the assertion
of any and all rights by those affected by the Act. Every per-
son in interest is given his "day in court."2 In accordance with
approved practice the Act generally provides that a person
who considers himself aggrieved by any order of the admin-
istrative authority must first appeal to the highest authority
of the district before he appeals to the ordinary court of law,
and provision is made against unnecessary delay of the work.2
But the Act expressly recognizes the right of property owners
to remain in possession of their property until they have ac-
cepted the compenisation awarded by the appraisers or until
the amount of compensation has been determined by a jury
of the county where the property is located. An appeal to a
jury may be taken also from the appraisal of benefits.2 In
22 Ohio G.C. 6828-I8, -I9, -20, -24, -25, -65. I Ops. Atty. Gen., pp.
105, 220, 222, 248.
21 Miami County v. Daytow, 92 Ohio St. 215, 11o N.E. 726.
Silvey v. Commissioners, 273 Fed. 20z.
Orr v. Allen, 16 Ohio L.Rep. 457.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Goodnow: "Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S," p. 47.
Ohio G.C. 6828-32, also G.C. 6828-34, -58, -62.
27 Ohio G.C. 6828-34.
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case a jury trial is demanded in order to determine compensa-
tion for property taken the proceedings must be in accordance
with the usual procedure in appropriation actions;2" but the
orders of the court creating the district and adopting the official
plan are generally considered a judicial determination of the
public necessity of the work. It has been held that a judge is
not disqualified to preside at an appropriation proceeding be-
cause he has sat as a member of the District Court. 9
The provisions of the Act for appropriation of land and
easements, when no exceptions are filed or jury trials de-
manded, are extremely expeditious." That private property
may be taken by administrative order with no more notice than
general publication and without explicit description of the prop-
erty to be taken, is somewhat shocking to the legal sensibilities
of the ordinary lawyer."' The law has been upheld, however,
the appraisal and publication being construed as an offer, and
acquiescence as an acceptance. 2 This could be done because the
right to object and demand a jury trial is expressly safe-
guarded.3 The actual procedure under the law has shown the
need of more express provisions as to manner of paying for
land so taken and of obtaining good record tide.
It has been the practice of districts to appropriate flood
easements on land above dams and to pay at once in full for the
right to cause periodic overflow in the future. It would seem
to be more in harmony with the general purpose of the Act and
more consistent with sound public policy to provide for the
present payment of only a nominal price but to give with it a
2sIbid.
2, State, ex rel., Sparta Ceramic Co. v. Lindsay, 130 Ohio St. 461.
30 Ohio G.C. 6828-30 to 37.
", Such authority approximates military power, although it has long been
recognized as belonging to civil authorities in case of public exigencies. Ordi-
nance of 1787, Art. 2. Constitution of Ohio, Art. I, Sec. 19. Ohio G.C. 436.
Giesy v. C. W. & Z. R. R., 4 Ohio St. 308.
32 Conservancy District v. Bowers, ioo Ohio St. 317, 319. See also Cupp
v. Seneca Co., 19 Ohio St. 173; Portage Co. v. Gates, 83 Ohio St. 19, 93
N.E. 255.
" Conservancy District v. Bowers, ioo Ohio St. 317, 319; Orr v. Allen,
6 Ohio L.Rep. 457.
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guaranty to indemnify future occupants of the land against loss
of normal crops. Under such plan there would be less hazard
in fixing the present price and future payments would go to
the persons who must suffer loss from the operation of the
dam. The district would become a kind of insurer against flood
damage and would have to be empowered to create a fund for
such purpose. But such a plan would seem to be a natural ex-
tension of the operation and benefit of the administrative func-
tion.
The Act vests in the board ample powers regarding the
financial administration of the district. The directors are au-
thorized to receive advancements from the counties in the
district for preliminary expenses. They are authorized to levy
a general tax 4 upon the property of the district, and also to
levy special assessments based upon appraised benefits. Re-
peated assessments may be levied so long as the total amount
levied does not exceed the benefits, and bonds may be issued in
anticipation of the collection of assessments. The directors
are at liberty to do anything in connection with the issuance of
bonds of the district which they may consider convenient and
adapted to the end for which the bonds are authorized to be
issued and which is not in violation of any express constitutional
or statutory limitations. 5 The liberal provisions of the law
regarding the issuance of bonds have caused a favorable market
for the obligations of conservancy districts. Such delegated
power to tax, assess, and issue bonds has been upheld. 6 It is
generally considered within the power of the legislature to
determine in what manner the funds shall be raised to defray
the costs of public work.
The financial resources of the district are directed into three
funds: the preliminary fund, bond fund, and maintenance
" "Local tax in the nature of an assessment," applicable to real estate.
Miami Co. v. Dayton, 9 z Ohio St. 229, 230.
35 1 Ops. Atty. Gen., p. 705.
38 Miami Co. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. Z30, citing County of Mobile v.
Kimball, Ioz U. S. 691, and Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 248
Mo. 373, (affirmed 239 U. S. 254).
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fund." At least once a year, and oftener if the court shall so
order, the directors must make a report of their proceedings
and of their receipts and expenditures. The Bureau of Inspec-
tion and Supervision of Public Offices is required to inspect and
supervise the accounts and reports of the district." Thus one
administrative agency is made a check against another.
The flood control project of the Miami Conservancy Dis-
trict was successfully developed and administered under the
provisions of the Act. When in 1933 the public works program
of the Federal Government was developed, the Conservancy
Act of Ohio afforded the way by which a much broader con-
servation project could be developed. Although the lower
portions of the Muskingum valley in eastern Ohio had also
suffered severe flood losses in 1913, and at various times there-
after, a project involving only flood control could not be devel-
oped in that immediate territory as it had been in the Miami
valley because of the different topography of the country. A
unified district in the Muskingum watershed would necessarily
embrace sixteen or eighteen counties. The highland counties
were not interested in a flood-control project. After the
drought of 193o, however, such counties became interested in
water conservation. But the cost of the project was too much
for the district to bear alone. When the Federal Government
announced its intention to sponsor the control of floods in the
Ohio valley as a part of its public works program, it became
apparent to residents of the Muskingum valley that if the
efforts of the district and the United States Government could
be united, something might be accomplished which would con-
trol floods in the Ohio and the Muskingum valleys, and also
afford some water conservation for the highland counties. It
was also apparent that the State of Ohio would be interested
because of the protection which such project would afford state
highways, bridges, and other property. Fortunately the Con-
servancy Act provided that the directors should have the right
" Ohio G.C. 6828-42.
" Ohio G.C. 6828-57.
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and authority to enter into contracts or other arrangements with
the United States Government or any department thereof, and
with the state government and other public corporations, for
cooperation or assistance in constructing, maintaining, and
operating the works of the district.39
This led to the creation of the Muskingum Watershed Con-
servancy District and the contract, March 29, 1934, between
such District and the United States of America through the
Public Works Administrator, and also the contract, July 18,
1934, between the District and the State of Ohio through the
Director of Highways. The District became the principal ad-
ministrative agency and agreed to furnish the land and ease-
ments necessary for the project. The United States Govern-
ment agreed to construct fourteen dams through the Corps of
United States Engineers and defray the expense of relocation
of utilities. The State of Ohio, in addition to a general grant
from the legislature, agreed to relocate all highways which had
to be changed because of the work of the District.
The Muskingum District was a pioneer in such cooperative
effort. It affords an interesting example of what can be done by
administrative agencies to bridge the gap between powers whol-
ly within states' rights and the authority of the Federal Gov-
ernment under the Constitution.4" It is somewhat in line with
recent attempts to overcome by treaty the barriers to certain
police regulations which the courts had said neither the federal
nor the state governments had authority to make. It tends to
decrease the area of the constitutional "no man's land." 4' Ap-
11 Ohio G.C. 6828-23.
40 "Complete independence of the federal and state governments was
neither contemplated by the Fathers nor carried out in actual administrative
practice by their successors. Government has surged forward ruthlessly,
blurring ;he line of cleavage between the two opposing views concerning fed-
eral centralization and local autonomy. This surge has often merged centrali-
zation with decentralization. There is therefore need for examination of
administrative arrangements midway between the extremes of centralization
and localization." Jane Perry Clark, Vol. LI, Political Science Quarterly,
No. 2, p. 230.
4 Lloyd K. Garrison: "The Constitution and the Future," Vol. LXXXV,
The New Republic, No. 1104, p. 328. See also Bernard Kilgore: "The No
Man's Land Provisions," Vol. 42, Case & Comment, No. 2, p. 4.
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prehension was expressed at the time of making such contracts
that jealousy and attendant friction between the various agen-
cies would prevent successful cooperation. The developments,
however, have completely dispelled such apprehensions. All
differences between the operating agents of the various divisions
of government have been settled without appeal to higher
administrative or judicial authority, and certain advantages
have developed from the harmonious coordination of the vari-
ous agencies.
The Muskingum District project was begun largely as a
relief measure against the business depression, and it has pro-
gressed with record-making dispatch. In spite of the haste
required, no instance of mismanagement or corruption has been
discovered. The work has been praised by army and executive
officers of Washington and by representatives of foreign gov-
ernments.4" These accomplishments have been due in large
part to the greater selectivity in the process of choosing officers
and agents by the administrative function than by the ordinary
political method. This process must be developed and main-
tained if liberalism is to be able to meet the competition of the
various forms of absolutism in the world today.43 As stated
above our problem is to develop the efficiency of the adminis-
trative function while we jealously preserve the legal principles
and judicial processes which have made our republic "a govern-
ment of law and not of men."
42 See Annual Report of the Chief of Staff of Army Engineers for year
1935, and press reports of comments by representatives to World Power Con-
ference (1936). Zanesville Times Recorder, Sept. z, 1936.
41 Sir Willmott Lewis: "Interplay and Equilibrium of Governmental Pow-
ers," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
March, 1935, p. 36.
